People's Liberation Army Operational Concepts
ResearchPublished Sep 29, 2020
In this report, the authors assess China's current military theory, strategy, and guiding principles, and they also delineate notional doctrinal or operational concepts that likely underpin People's Liberation Army military planning. This report is intended as a primer for U.S. Department of Defense strategists and planners as they conduct campaign planning and formulate responses to China's evolving military strategy and doctrine.
ResearchPublished Sep 29, 2020
In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to complete ongoing force modernization efforts by 2035 and become a world-class military capable of fighting and winning wars in any theater of operations by 2050. Although the PLA has made impressive modernization progress over the past three decades, it is unclear how this effort would translate to battlefield performance between now and Xi's 2035 goal. Chinese military theory, strategy, and operational concepts are key to understanding how the PLA might fight when called on to do so.
In this report, the authors assess China's current military theory, strategy, and guiding principles, and they also delineate notional doctrinal or operational concepts that likely underpin People's Liberation Army military planning. The assessments in this report are derived from analysis of authoritative Chinese government, military, media, and scholarly sources, supplemented by a literature review of Western scholarship. The authors analyzed these sources to understand, from the Chinese perspective, People's Republic of China policy and strategic direction regarding PLA force development over time. This report is intended as a primer for U.S. Department of Defense strategists and planners as they conduct campaign planning and formulate responses to China's evolving military strategy and doctrine.
This research was sponsored by the China Strategic Focus Group, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and conducted within the Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI).
This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.