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Performance Evaluation and Army Recruiting
Designing and implementing performance metrics that support Army goals requires analysis of how different metrics would affect recruiter behavior and, in turn, recruiters’ contributions toward achieving the Army’s goals. The authors evaluate traditional performance metrics, such as number of contracts signed per month per recruiter, and find that they do not adequately measure recruiter effort, skill, and productivity. They then develop a “preferred performance metric” that takes into account the difficulty of recruiting different types of youth in various markets. Using a performance metric that better reflects Army values and more accurately assesses recruiter effort and skill would have significant benefits. However, because the recruiter reward system is deeply engrained, the authors propose modest, gradual changes to the system — for example, improving mission allocation algorithms to reflect variations in market quality and differences in market segments and lengthening the performance evaluation window to at least six months to reduce emphasis on monthly station-level mission accomplishment.
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Pages: 126
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Contents
Chapter One:
Introduction
Chapter Two:
Models of Recruiter Effort, Market Quality, and Enlistment Supply
Chapter Three:
Data and Econometric Estimates of Contract-Production Models
Chapter Four:
Empirical Analysis of Performance Measures
Chapter Five:
Choosing Performance Windows and Organizational Units for Evaluation
Chapter Six:
Conclusions
Appendix A:
Allocation of Recruiter Effort: Implications of a Microeconomic Model
Appendix B:
Recruiter Behavior in the Face of Risk
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.
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