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Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Major Findings and Recommendations

Cover: Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom

By: Eric Peltz, Marc Robbins, Kenneth J. Girardini, Rick Eden, John Halliday, Jeffrey Angers

By virtually every account, the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in the spring of 2003 were a remarkable success. Yet there is a general belief within the Army and the broader defense community, supported by RAND Arroyo Center’s analysis, that this success was achieved despite logistics problems that hampered materiel sustainment. However, moving beyond the initial impressions that emerged quickly following operations, Arroyo’s research has indicated that forces and sustainment capabilities were sufficiently robust to overcome the problems and effectively execute missions. This monograph describes how well the Department of Defense logistics system supported Army forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, documents the major reasons for shortfalls in performance, provides recommendations for improvement, and points to questions raised with respect to the design of future forces.

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Paperback Cover Price: $25.00

Discounted Web Price: $22.50

Pages: 152

ISBN/EAN: 0-8330-3783-8

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Contents

Chapter One:
Sustainment of Army Units in OIF

Chapter Two:
Tactical Supply Operations

Chapter Three:
Theater Distribution

Chapter Four:
Strategic Distribution

Chapter Five:
National- and Theater-Level Inventory

Chapter Six:
Command and Control

Chapter Seven:
Implications for the Future

Appendix A:
Outline of Recommendations

Appendix B:
Key Terms

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

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