Chapter Two

SUMMARY OF RAND RESEARCH ON POSTMOBILIZATION TRAINING FOR ENHANCED BRIGADES

As mentioned, RAND previously conducted a comprehensive study to determine the postmobilization resources needed to prepare heavy ESBs for deployment to a combat theater. As part of that study, we developed a detailed training model for such brigades. In that model, we laid out a complete schedule of events for each organization in a brigade combat team (BCT) in the postmobilization training program.[1] We then developed three options for executing the model and determined the resources needed to execute each.

That previous analysis provided the basis for the integrated division study. First, it provided a brigade training model upon which to superimpose division-level events, which allows us to develop a training model for the integrated division. Second, the brigade training model and the resources identified for training three enhanced separate brigades give us a point of comparison, against which we can measure the postmobilization time and resources required to train an integrated division.

[1]A divisional brigade combat team is not a fixed organization. Instead it contains a headquarters and headquarters company and is assigned a number of maneuver battalions, typically from three to five. It also has other combat support and combat service support organizations attached or placed in support. Task-organized brigades are referred to as brigade combat teams. A typical brigade combat team would have three maneuver battalions assigned, a combat engineer battalion, a field artillery battalion, an air defense battery, and a forward support battalion in direct support. Other small detachment-sized elements such as signal, intelligence, and MPs are also normally provided. On the other hand, a separate brigade is a fixed organization that includes all the elements normally assigned to a divisional brigade combat team. It also contains enhanced support structure to provide capabilities normally provided to BCTs by the division. For simplicity, we call both entities BCTs throughout this document.

ASSUMPTIONS

To develop this heavy ESB postmobilization training model, it was necessary to make assumptions about the levels of premobilization training and of the readiness at which the brigades would begin postmobilization training. We bring the same set of assumptions to our analysis of the postmobilization training requirements of the integrated divisions.

We assume that the ARNG brigades will attempt to meet the training goals described in the regulation that outlines the Army's policy for premobilization reserve component training, that is, FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2.[2] These goals include tank and Bradley crew gunnery qualification, platoon-level maneuver proficiency, field sustainment, and command-and-control training at the level organized. However, we do not assume that these goals will necessarily be met. Many factors—e.g., attendance at annual training, attrition, and job turbulence—limit the ability of ESBs to reach and sustain these goals.[3]

We assume, instead, that the brigades will enter postmobilization training at the level achieved by the better brigades during annual training (AT).[4] We define this higher level of demonstrated proficiency as accomplishing the following during annual training:

- Seventy percent of assigned unit personnel attend annual training with the unit. This results in some crews and platoons that are composed of members from several crews or platoons.
- Most of the tank and Bradley crews firing during Annual Training meet Table VIII qualification requirements (more than 85 percent).

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[2]U.S. Forces Command/Army National Guard, Regulation 350-2, *Reserve Component Training*, Fort McPherson, GA, June 1996.

[3]Job turbulence and attrition would affect the training readiness of any unit, active or reserve, but it is more difficult for the Reserve Components, with their more limited training time, to compensate for these problems.

[4]The process of "enhancing" the ARNG separate brigades has been ongoing for some time. At the time of this study, some of the brigades had clearly progressed further in the process than others, for a variety of reasons. We made the optimistic assumption that, in time, all of the ESBs could achieve the level of performance and training readiness that we were currently observing (1991, 1992, and 1993) in the "better" brigades.

- Platoon offensive and defensive maneuver training are accomplished but, typically, in daylight only and for a subset of the tasks required for full combat proficiency.
- The brigade has demonstrated its ability to support itself in the field during its most recent annual training, and command and staff training should have taken place during the year at the level at which the unit was organized. That is, a battalion has had command and staff training at battalion level.
- Finally, all training has been conducted to the standards specified in Army training publications.

A brigade at this level of proficiency includes crew members trained well enough to start initial tank or Bradley live-fire tables after minimal refresher training. The brigade's platoons are trained well enough to go through a full set of specialized platoon situation training exercises (STX) after three to four days of refresher training. The primary purpose of the refresher training is to integrate cross-leveled personnel and replacements and to train a full set of required tasks.

We also assume that brigade-level postmobilization training focuses on the three missions developed by the Enhanced Brigade Task Force,[5] i.e., Attack, Defend, and Movement to Contact. However, we realize that the actual postmobilization Mission Essential Task List (METL) could change based on the CINC's theater requirements, and we purposely developed a training model that had sufficient time and resources to adjust to changed requirements.

We further assume that some key events have occurred by the time the brigades are ready to commence collective training, which we posit as M+18.[6] Our analysis assumes that the personnel readiness status for all units is at, or at least close to, P-1, that is, 90 percent of required personnel are present, qualified for their duty positions, and stabilized. We also assume that the equipment is ready, by

[5]Memorandum to Chief of Staff of the Army from DAMO-TRR, April 1994.

[6]In this analysis we assume that all preparation for deployment begins on the day the unit is mobilized, which we refer to as "M-day." Elements of the unit or the entire unit could be brought onto active duty prior to formal mobilization, and its preparation time would begin at that time.

which we mean that the unit has its major combat systems and all equipment needed for training, and, further, that almost all of that equipment is fully operational by M+18.[7] And we assume that the supply and maintenance support systems are able to keep the equipment operational and that the training site will have sufficient support (facilities, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System [MILES], personnel, parts, training ammunition, etc.) to begin training and to maintain the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the training.[8]

Finally, we presuppose that both the trainers and the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) have completed their preparation for the training.[9] We regard these assumptions as reasonable but optimistic.[10] Should they not hold, it will take longer to prepare the units for deployment than the times we use here.

THE TRAINING MODEL

Figure 1 presents an overview of our training model for an ESB. The large bar depicts the training for the combat elements, with the numbers atop the bar showing the time for each segment and those below showing cumulative days elapsed. The shorter bar shows the training for the commanders and staffs. This training occurs in parallel with that of the combat units. Training for combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) units, although not shown in the figure, also proceeds in parallel.[11]

The full training model contains detailed day-by-day training events for each unit in the brigade and incorporates as much parallel train-

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[7]See Army Regulation 220-1 for specific definitions of personnel, equipment on hand, and equipment serviceability ratings.

[8]At present, it is our understanding that the requirement for spare parts and training ammunition to support postmobilization training of ARNG combat units has not been funded. This issue deserves further investigation because it could seriously affect the postmobilization training.

[9]For most maneuver training, the Army will place "enemy forces" into the field to oppose the unit being trained. These are called OPFOR.

[10]With the further downsizing and funding shortfalls we see today, some would consider many of these assumptions extremely optimistic.

[11]See Lippiatt et al. (1996) for a detailed description of these activities.



Figure 1—Postmobilization Heavy ESB Training Model

ing as possible to reduce the overall time requirement. Following the training events in this model, the brigade is validated on tactical missions in 92 days and ready to move in 102.[12] Actual times could vary, of course, depending on the premobilization readiness of the unit and its deployment mission.

We used the training model as a basis for determining the resources needed for postmobilization training. The most important training resources to train enhanced brigades are the sites and several categories of training personnel. We canvassed the Army to identify the training sites, trainers, training support personnel, OPFOR, and garrison support that would be available to support the training of the enhanced brigades. This survey showed that considering the avail-

[12]The 102-day figure used in this report is RAND's estimate of the time it will take to prepare and train the brigades, not official DoD policy. DoD sets a goal of having the brigades ready to deploy in 90 days.

ability of all these resources, the Army could support up to three heavy brigade-level training sites.

Training Sites

Our analysis showed that five sites had sufficient space and facilities to support company-, battalion-, and brigade-level training. The Army has subsequently identified Forts Irwin and Hood and the Yakima Training Center as the ones it would use. Not all sites would be available immediately upon mobilization. Fort Irwin would be available almost immediately because it would not take long for any AC unit training there to pack up and return home to prepare for deployment. However, Fort Hood and the Yakima Training Center may be involved with the training and deployment of AC units, which could delay the training of the enhanced ARNG brigades at those sites between 30 and 45 days.

Although few installations have the space to support force-on-force maneuver and Combined Arms Live Fire Exercises (CALFEX) training required by the training model for company-, battalion-, and brigade-level training, quite a few can support the required gunnery (through platoon-level qualification on Table XII) and platoon- or section-level drill training.[13] We found that we could speed the deployment of brigades by using these installations for gunnery and lower-level collective training (we call them “gunnery sites”). Our prior study showed that using gunnery training sites enables all brigades following the initial set of three brigades to arrive at the brigade sites having already completed gunnery and some platoon-level training. This strategy reduces the time required at brigade training sites by 23 days. Using gunnery sites, the fourth through sixth brigades could be validated for combat missions at M+149 and ready for movement at M+159. The gunnery sites also figure into our strategies for the integrated divisions. Again, early access to some potential gunnery sites, e.g., Fort Riley and Fort Carson, may be delayed because of AC postalert training.

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[13]Drill training differs from fuller forms of maneuver training in that the organization practices the tasks without an OPFOR.

Personnel and OPFOR

Training requires six categories of personnel: trainers, training management personnel, training support personnel, simulation support personnel, installation and higher-echelon support personnel, and OPFOR.

Our analysis of ESB postmobilization training shows that it requires about 1,800 active component trainers and training managers to staff three brigade training sites. Almost all these personnel can be drawn from the NTC and AC organizations dedicated to support RC training in peacetime.[14,15]

About 1,000 training support personnel are also needed. Such personnel are needed for many types of general support to training that do not require trainer skills. Included are range guards, drivers, and similar personnel. The ARNG divisions can supply them.

Some additional units are required for the training sites because some of the support units normally there in peacetime will have deployed. Such units provide higher-echelon support to AC maneuver units. Meeting this requirement takes an additional 5,000 people (about 1,700 per brigade training site). Some of these functions could be contracted to private firms, or RC units could be tasked to provide them. In addition, the USAR Divisions (Exercise) are also tasked to provide simulations support.

The OPFOR requirement is about the equivalent of a separate brigade at each training site. The OPFOR at the NTC, the 11th ACR, can provide some of the OPFOR required, but additional forces must come from the ARNG divisions.

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[14]Our analysis revealed some MOS or branch shortages. This shortfall is less than 200, and we assumed that they could be provided by individual replacement from the Army at large. A more important point is that three heavy brigade–level sites is the most that can be staffed with available AC personnel currently programmed to support RC readiness.

[15]At the time we did this study, just under 8,000 AC soldiers were dedicated to RC support. Since then, this level of support has been reviewed by the Army's leadership and is in the process of being reduced to just over 6,000, with the details of this organization being finalized. Our review of the new organizational concept indicates that sufficient postmobilization AC trainers will continue to be available for up to three brigade training sites.

Key Implications from the Brigade Analysis

The total requirement for Reserve Component forces to be mobilized to support training three heavy enhanced brigades is about 20,000, according to the previous analysis.

The assumptions about and resource analysis of the ESB postmobilization training provide the foundation of our analysis of the time and additional resources required for the division elements. Key assumptions for the brigade analysis are those about the ESBs' levels of training, personnel and equipment status, and the preparedness of the trainers and training support personnel. Should any of these not hold, it will take longer than the 102 days we posit to produce a trained brigade.

From a resource perspective, a crucial item is the availability of the training sites—brigade, company, and gunnery. The Army has more than enough facilities to support the training, but their availability is problematic. With the exception of Fort Irwin, the facilities designated by the Army for the brigade sites and those that could serve as company sites have commitments to active units during mobilization. Any delay in deploying the AC units will necessarily slow RC deployments.