Global Implications for
the U.S. Air Force
| By Edward R. Harshberger |
Edward Harshberger, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE at RAND, is leading a study of U.S. Air Force counterterrorism strategies.
Since Sept. 11, the United States Air Force (USAF) has played a critical role in America's response to terrorist threats, from protecting our nation's skies to patrolling the mountains of Afghanistan. Despite early successes and the general absence of major attacks, challenges remain.
New Demands on the Military
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The figure gives a fair (and daunting) illustration of what the future holds for U.S. military operations. The nature and scope of overseas operations will depend on the strength of the foreign states involved (vertical axis) and their relation to terrorists (horizontal axis). Strong regimes that are hostile to terrorists fit in the upper left corner. These states are candidates for close cooperation in intelligence and police matters—and relatively low levels of military activity. Strong regimes that are permissive of terrorists (upper right corner) are candidates for military coercion, up to and including regime change. These operations were central elements of pre-9/11 strategy and force sizing constructs.
The newly important military tasks stem from the increased likelihood of significant operations in fundamentally weak states (lower half of figure). These operations will include a wide range of activities, depending on a regime's attitude toward terrorist groups. The operations could include the following:
These operations may occur simultaneously or in combination and are likely to take place in locations that differ greatly in environment, climate, geography, and threat characteristics.
Recent history is powerful proof of the growing importance of these military tasks. The fight against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups has already begun to extend the reach of these kinds of operations beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan (e.g., to the Philippines). Here is a list of some of the countries where the U.S. military could become involved in uprooting terrorist groups over the coming years: Algeria, Bosnia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
These far-flung and diverse locations are logical extensions of our current campaign against Al Qaeda and other globally networked and highly dangerous terrorist groups. Prior to Sept. 11, involvement of U.S. military forces in almost any of these locations (while still engaged in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Operations Northern and Southern Watch) was virtually unthinkable. That said, multiple and simultaneous U.S. military operations have been the norm since 1990 and are likely to remain an ongoing feature of the post-9/11 world.
The array of newly important military tasks and operating locations will have a dramatic impact on select elements of the USAF. First and foremost, these operations will necessitate the development of effective international coalitions, and the U.S. military (including the USAF) is a potent instrument in this regard. At a minimum, the USAF can expect heightened demand for military coalition support activities (e.g., military-to-military contacts, training, education, and exercises) and an increase in overseas temporary deployments for USAF personnel with language and diplomatic skills.
USAF combat operations in many countries will take place in complex environments and terrain and will confront low-signature, deceptive targets (individuals and small groups) while being constrained by tight rules of engagement. This implies potentially large disparities in the relative weight of effort between intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions and strike functions. Highly persistent ISR operations will be needed, coupled with rapid, effective analysis of information to enable brief, intense combat engagements. These efforts will place increased demands on precisely the kinds of "high demand/low density" assets (and their associated career specialists) that are in shortest supply today.
The need for persistent surveillance and precise attacks at an expanded number of forward locations should motivate a continued search for new concepts and technologies. This can and should include redoubled emphasis on high-resolution, persistent ISR technologies, such as the Predator and Global Hawk unmanned air vehicles (the former used in both Kosovo and Afghanistan, the latter used in Afghanistan). The search should also include the pursuit of increasingly sophisticated guidance systems for kinetic weapons, as well as the expanded development by the USAF of highly discriminate methods of attack, including nonlethal weaponry.
The war in Afghanistan has placed more importance than ever on the USAF's plans to modernize its airlift and aging air tanker fleets. The war has produced the third largest airlift operation in history (in terms of tonnage) after the Berlin Airlift and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. For Operation Enduring Freedom, all supplies to forward locations were delivered by air for the first six months—a first in history.
This unprecedented and unanticipated effort was aided by new combat support approaches, collectively termed agile combat support, that were necessitated by the significant increase in operations tempo over the past decade. The use of centralized intermediate repair facilities has been a key success to date, enhancing support activities and minimizing in-theater footprint. However, a future environment that entails relatively small-scale but lengthy (and sporadically intense) operations will generate new stresses on the system and require more innovation. Overseas activities—even when they involve no actual combat—will also raise a host of force protection concerns with potentially serious resource implications.
The rapid, agile, and effective performance of any military depends on the right mix of well-trained personnel. The USAF total force was already under stress prior to Sept. 11. With existing resources, U.S. defense decisionmakers may have to choose: Either accept more risk while maintaining the same level of effort, or limit the number or duration of operations in which the U.S. military will participate. Unfortunately, the latter stance seems at variance with the demands of U.S. national security strategy, particularly with respect to a long-term war against terrorism. Manpower reductions appear difficult to support, at least in the short term.
Finally, it is important that the military demands of counterterrorism strategy be considered in context. Military operations are not the primary means for countering terrorism, and other demands on the military remain. An increased emphasis on combating terrorism will not, in all likelihood, prompt wholesale changes in the USAF's force structure. Nonetheless, an open and active search for new concepts and approaches—coupled with resources—will remain essential for the USAF to maintain its flexibility and effectiveness in the days ahead.
New Demands on the USAF