Beware of Cracks in
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| By Jerrold D. Green |
Jerrold Green is director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy and of International Programs and Development at RAND.
A number of regional challenges that have arisen in the Middle East since Sept. 11 have complicated the ability of U.S. policymakers to focus on the global war on terrorism. Although this war is clearly the first priority of the United States, effectively waging such an ambitious and wide-ranging military campaign depends on extensive global diplomatic, political, intelligence, and economic efforts as well. U.S. military initiatives can potentially be affected by U.S. initiatives in these other spheres.
An overarching concern of those charged with conducting the war on terrorism is the importance of building and maintaining a global coalition. This priority is enormously important both symbolically and practically. For despite the awesome power of the United States, it is inconceivable that even Washington could tackle this monumental task on its own.
What is worrisome today is that U.S. policymakers are involved in a series of political engagements throughout the Middle East, many of which may unintentionally operate at cross-purposes with one another. Although Washington's primary commitment is to the war on terrorism, which is of necessity sustained by a broad-based international coalition, those in Washington must also confront a number of other challenges in the Middle East, the successful execution of which may possibly come at the expense of the same antiterrorism coalition that the United States has so painstakingly constructed. Granted, not all crises can be resolved by the same coalitions, and some partnerships can be sustained only at a cost to others. But nowhere in the world is this complexity more evident or perilous than in the Middle East.
Perhaps the country most outspoken about its concern with events in Afghanistan has been neighboring Iran. As the Karzai government consolidates its power, other regional actors are likely to express concerns of their own, including possibly Pakistan, with its deep, long-standing, and not necessarily constructive interests in and ties with Afghanistan.
The process of nation building, particularly in a setting as fractious as Afghanistan, necessarily provides power to some while depriving it of others. Invariably, these internal groups and interests have external corollaries. Thus, although we cannot predict with any certainty who will lose and who will win in Afghanistan, we can be certain that the ensuing power struggle will affect Afghanistan's neighbors and thus Washington's ability to keep intact a regional coalition against terrorism as well.
AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/JASSIM MOHAMMED Students of Islamic studies in Baghdad, Iraqone carrying a picture of Iraqi leader Saddam Husseinchant slogans in support of the Palestinians on April 21. |
A serious debate is raging in Washington over the degree to which the United States should forcefully hasten the political demise of Saddam. The debate in Washington obscures a larger problem: The U.S. quest for regional support against Saddam Hussein may be at odds with the U.S. campaign against terrorism. It is highly revealing that although a number of senior members of the Bush administration have traveled the Middle East in general and the Arab world in particular to seek support for U.S. military action against Iraq, the results have been uniformly disappointing.
Most Arab leaders argue that the United States should make progress on the Palestinian front before storming the Iraqi front. This recommendation is somewhat disingenuous, largely because the Arab leaders themselves offer little tangible assistance to the Palestinians, and their admonition is offered simply as an excuse to justify their opposition to U.S. military action against Iraq. What the Arab leaders really fear, of course, is the response of their own people and the ensuing fallout should they support U.S. military action against a fellow Arab state.
While the debate on military action against Iraq is complex, one clear policy consideration emerges. That is, any attempt by the United States to forcefully unseat Saddam Hussein must be weighed against the possible risks to the U.S.-led coalition against international terrorism. In that coalition, support for the United States by an assortment of regional powers in the Middle East is imperative but far from certain or immutable.
Although the United States wishes to play the role of an honest broker, its Arab coalition partners are more sympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians than they are to the plight of the Israeli people and Ariel Sharon. This situation further complicates U.S. attempts to defuse the growing crisis between the Israelis and Palestinians.
President Bush has offered a new U.S. peace plan, but it is highly controversial and seems certain to influence his ability to operate elsewhere in the Middle East. Put simply, Bush has come out in favor of the gradual creation of a Palestinian state, which raises concerns in Israel. At the same time, Bush is insisting that the Palestinians replace Yasser Arafat with another leader who is less duplicitous and more amenable to making peace. The latter part of the formulation has discomfited an Arab world that is concerned about Washington trying to decide who should lead the Palestinian people, regardless of Washington's unambiguous support for a Palestinian state. In addition, the Arab world is concerned about Washington's inability as yet to provide details about a Palestinian state or a timetable for this effort.
AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS/HASAN SARBAKHSHIAN In a July 24 ceremony in Tehran, Iranian soldiers carry coffins of prisoners killed during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. The two countries exchanged the remains of soldiers on July 21, 2002. In the background, an upside-down American flag reads, "Down with USA." |
Will progress be made on the Palestinian-Israeli front at the expense of the international coalition against terrorism? Or at the expense of U.S.-Arab or U.S.-Israeli relations? To what degree does the threat of Saddam Hussein justify jeopardizing the coalition against terrorism or other U.S. regional interests? For example, action against Saddam might make it more difficult to negotiate an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, because Arab antipathy to the United States could drive Arab states to oppose the Bush peace planwhich itself is not free of controversy.
An endless number of possible scenarios of this sort can be played out, all of which highlight how difficult the situation is for the Bush team. It is forced to deal with the daunting dangers of international terrorism, a newly confident Iraq, and a festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It remains to be seen how effectively President Bush and his advisers can make their way through this enormously threatening regional environment.