Control Biological
Weapons, but Defend
Biotechnology

By John Parachini

John Parachini is a RAND policy analyst.

The fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States posed a number of unprecedented policy challenges that have yet to be resolved. The very nature of the attacks has highlighted the critical need for greater synergy among the fields of security, public health, law enforcement, science, and biotechnology. Specifically, given how biological weapons can be clandestinely produced and delivered much more easily than other weapons, the biological threats present unique challenges for defense, intelligence, arms control, and public health.

While the attacks did cause five tragic deaths, the greatest impact was psychological and political. Despite several years of exercises preparing to respond to such attacks, government authorities at all levels seemed ill prepared for the crisis. We must improve our public management of bioterrorism incidents. Effectively managing the psychological impact of such incidents may largely reduce the value of biological weapons as a means of terror.

Fortunately, some measures to address these challenges offer dual-use benefits against natural outbreaks of disease, which are more likely than unnatural outbreaks. In many instances, improving public health capabilities to prevent and to treat naturally occurring outbreaks will also be valuable for addressing intentionally caused outbreaks.

Ultimately, though, the threat of biological terrorism cannot be sufficiently countered by even a seamless cooperation among all of the pertinent experts and government agencies from any single country. The unprecedented ease with which biological pathogens can be transported around the globe calls for equally unprecedented global initiatives to contain and regulate them. At the same time, it is important to make sure that in our rush to address the threat of biological weapons, we do not adopt measures restricting legitimate scientific and commercial endeavors that generate tremendous societal value and may also be critical to reducing our vulnerability to biological weapons.

Anthrax Lessons

There are at least three possible origins of the sophisticated strains of anthrax that were mailed to government leaders and the media last fall. The origin could have been either a hostile state, a terrorist group acting on behalf of a hostile state, or an individual or group acting independently or with assistance from scientists willing to sell their expertise. But no matter the origin, an important threshold has been crossed that security officials and analysts previously considered unlikely. It was once generally believed to be too difficult for terrorists to produce sophisticated biological weapons and too risky for states to use them clandestinely against the United States. These assumptions are no longer valid.

The ongoing search for the perpetrator of the attacks has further highlighted the many sources of biological materials that countries and terrorists can draw upon to acquire the materials needed for making biological weapons. The same materials, expertise, and equipment that are vital to the biotechnology revolution, which offers tremendous promise, can also be used for tremendous evil. Controlling the supply of deadly biological materials requires a fine balance between enhancing security and yet not unduly constricting legitimate scientific and commercial research.

For purposes of security, the attacks raise critical questions about the international mechanisms for stemming the proliferation of biological weapons, deterring states and terrorists from using them, and punishing those who do use them. Eliminating the risk of attacks with biological weapons is unlikely, but a combination of national and international measures can make it more difficult for rogue states and terrorists to acquire the weapons and may also dissuade and deter their use.

Tighten Control Over Materials

A new global effort must be made to prevent the proliferation of dangerous pathogens to irresponsible states, organizations, and individuals. There are almost 100 collections of biological cultures in the United States and more than 450 collections around the world. Standards for physically protecting the cultures and for accounting for their distribution vary widely. Control over culture collections, research facilities, and outbreak sites needs to be enhanced worldwide.

In 1996, the United States improved the oversight of its cultures after an individual with ties to antigovernment groups fraudulently sought disease cultures from one collection. These oversight measures still contained considerable loopholes and lacked effective enforcement. According to recent amendments to the USA Patriot Act, which Congress swiftly prepared after Sept. 11 and the anthrax attacks, the United States will soon require the registration of all facilities that handle dangerous biological agents, require background reviews of people who work with such agents, and prohibit researchers from countries that support terrorism from working with these agents.

Beyond the United States, it is frightening to note what little regulation other countries have imposed governing the transfer, storage, and use of dangerous pathogens. The international community must strive to strike a balance between allowing pathogen commerce for legitimate commercial and scientific purposes and preventing the transfer of deadly materials to people who will use them as weapons.

Update the Global Legal Regime

The current international legal regime is inadequate for the evolving problem of biological weapons proliferation, because the legal regime focuses on the activities of states, not subnational groups or individuals. The Biological Weapons Convention, which was negotiated three decades ago at the height of the cold war, was once a landmark accord. But both the international system and the field of biotechnology have changed dramatically since then.

An obvious imperfection of current nonproliferation accords is their aim to prevent the proliferation of dangerous weapons to states. When these accords were negotiated, the problem of terrorists or rogue individuals assembling the capability to wield such weapons was viewed as highly unlikely. Even though terrorists have acquired or used biological weapons in only a very few cases, there are a number of indicators that this historical trend may be changing. Thus, some experts have proposed an international accord to criminalize the possession, transfer, and use of chemical and biological weapons by individuals. This accord would provide the international legal framework to prosecute anyone, from the terrorist to the head of state, who uses chemical or biological weapons. This initiative seeks to fill a void in the existing international legal framework.

The mapping of the human genome and the anthrax attacks are poignant indicators of the importance that biotechnology can play in the 21st century—for good or ill. The challenge before us is to minimize the potential for the material of life to be used to inflict death.

Control BiologicalWeapons, but DefendBiotechnology

Anthrax Lessons

Tighten Control Over Materials

Update the Global Legal Regime

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Control Biological
Weapons, but Defend
Biotechnology