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Three Decades of Experience with the All-Volunteer Force Have Charted a Course to Success

Several recurring themes characterize the evolution of the all-volunteer force: leadership in overcoming institutional resistance to change, analysis in forecasting the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, determination in identifying the right people to recruit and how to recruit them, the difference that pay and benefits make in recruiting and retaining personnel, and the need for an ongoing budgetary commitment to sustain success.

At times since 1973, policymakers either allowed military pay to fall too far behind civilian earnings or curtailed recruiting and personnel programs. The cutbacks often came at the worst times: when the civilian economy was strong and youth unemployment was low. Each time, recruiting and retention suffered. It took a large infusion of resources in 1978 and 1979 to correct the oversight before recruiting turned around in 1980, and it took even larger increases in 1998 and 1999 before recruiting rebounded in 2000.

As noted by former U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman, a principal architect of the all-volunteer force: It might be called an all-volunteer force, but it is really an “all-recruited force.”

BILL GENTILE/CORBIS

U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman (1931–1995), shown here in 1989, was an ardent supporter of the all-volunteer force. During the difficult years of the late 1970s and early 1980s, he argued that investments in “human capital” early on would ultimately yield great returns in an efficient and well-trained fighting force. In this effort, he challenged both the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Congress to allocate the resources needed to recruit and to retain high-quality personnel.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

February 21, 1970 — Gates Commission (above) informs President Richard Nixon (center right): “We unanimously believe that the nation’s interest will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts.”

1976 — Recruiting funds are cut sharply.

1979 — All four services fail to meet their recruiting goals. Army falls short of its mission by 17 percent. Quality of recruits falls below minimum levels established by the U.S. Department of Defense.

1979 — Army General Maxwell Thurman institutes “Be All You Can Be” advertising campaign.

1979 — The armed services discover a “tragedy of errors” involving four years of inflated enlistee test scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.

1980 — Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. “The Selective Service System must be revitalized,” declares President Jimmy Carter.

1980 and 1981 — Congress legislates two large pay raises for the military: 11.7 and 14.3 percent, respectively.

1984 — Congress passes Montgomery GI Bill, providing a “contributory educational program” for all who enlist after June 30, 1985. Enlistees may draw benefits upon completion of service.

1991 — Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf War) proves “the all-volunteer force worked,” according to a Pentagon report. “The enlisted force exhibited unprecedented skill, commitment, maturity, and professionalism. The entire officer corps . . . consistently demonstrated skill, excellence, leadership, and professionalism we have not seen in this century — if ever.”

December 25, 1991 — Soviet Union ceases to exist. The end of the Cold War prompts leaders of both major political parties to champion a smaller, transformed force throughout the 1990s despite the rapid spread of nontraditional operations.

Late 1990s — Recruiting budgets reduced in aftermath of Cold War. Unemployment reaches a 30-year low. Services again find it difficult to achieve recruiting goals.

1998 and 1999 — Congress approves large increases in recruiting resources, including pay raises, bigger advertising budgets, and a “college-first” program.

Since 2003 — With nearly 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the all-volunteer force is being tested as never before.

2004 — U.S. House votes 400 to 2 to reject a return to conscription.

1970 — Critical Breakthrough by Gates Commission Staff Was to Estimate the Supply of New Recruits, Pointing to the Pay Increases Needed for an All-Volunteer Force

Economists transformed the blue area beneath a normal frequency distribution (top) into a point on an aggregate enlistment supply schedule (above), showing that small increases in expected military benefits would attract large increases in recruits — up to that point.

1986 — One of Several Experiments to Test Recruiting Programs Compared the Effects of Enlistment Bonuses of Varying Amounts and Required Years of Service

Plan C triggered a startling 178-percent increase in three-year terms among those who would have signed up for two years anyway. Overall, the up-front bonuses spurred a 4-percent increase in high-quality recruits and a 15-percent increase in four-year terms.

2002 — Pay for Midcareer Enlisted Personnel with Some College Was No Longer Competitive with Civilian Pay, Prompting Creation of New Pay Table

NOTES: Data compare July 2000 regular military compensation (RMC) for enlisted ranks E-1 through E-7 with predicted year 2000 earnings of civilian males with some college. 50th percentile is the median (half earn more; half less).

SOURCES:

I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force, Bernard Rostker, RAND/MG-265-RC, 2006, 832 pp., ISBN 978-0-8330-3895-1 (hardcover with DVD), 978-0-8330-3896-8 (hardcover).

Full Document

“Impact of Pay and Draft Policy on Army Enlistment Behavior,” Alan E. Fechter, in Gates Commission, ed., Studies Prepared for the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

The Enlistment Bonus Experiment, J. Michael Polich, James N. Dertouzos, S. James Press, RAND/R-3353-FMP, 1986, available online only.

Full Document

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