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RAND Arroyo Center Publications — Research Briefs 2008
Select a Document Year: 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000 and Earlier
2009
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Does the United States Need a New Police Force for Stability Operations? — 2009
Considers the creation of a high-end police force for use in stability operations, examining its ideal size, how responsive it needs to be, where in the government it might be located, its needed capabilities, its proper staffing, and its cost.
The Capabilities That Medium-Armored Forces Bring to the Full Spectrum of Operations — 2009
Assesses the performance of medium-armored forces in 13 past conflicts, to better understand their unique capabilities and inform decisions about the Future Force.
2008
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Green Warriors: Army Environmental Considerations for Contingency Operations from Planning Through Post-Conflict — 2008
Recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans have highlighted the importance of environmental considerations. These range from protecting soldier health and disposing of hazardous waste to building water supply systems and other activities that help achieve national goals in the post-conflict phase of contingency operations. This study assesses whether existing policy, doctrine, and guidance adequately address environmental activities in post-conflict military operations and reconstruction.
2007
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Learning the Lessons of Hurricane Katrina for the U.S. Army — 2007
This research brief highlights the efforts undertaken by civilian and military organizations in response to Hurricane Katrina and discusses a number of steps can be taken to enhance future Army and National Guard disaster-response efforts.
2005
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Army Forces for Sustained Operations — 2005
The nation has difficult trade-offs in facing calls on Army forces for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report describes the effects of large deployments on the Army's ability to sustain overseas operations, to provide forces for other contingencies, to ensure that soldiers are trained, and to continue to recruit and retain soldiers.
Civilian or Military? Assessing the Risk of Using Contractors on the Battlefield — 2005
Key findings: --Contractors continue to play an important role in military operations --Any decision about using or not using contractors carries risk --Decisions about using contractors on the battlefi eld tend to be complex --A disciplined approach in applying the Army's risk management procedures to decisions about contractor use can clarify key considerations and help reduce the complexity of the decision.
How to Improve the Army's Management of Reparable Spare Parts — 2005
This report addresses initial efforts to expand the Army’s logistics-process improvement efforts initiative by applying an integrative approach to improving the responsiveness, reliability, and efficiency of the Army’s national-level inventory management and depot-level component-repair processes. The goal of these processes is to repair sufficient assets to replenish serviceable inventories to meet the needs of requirements determined to support equipment readiness.
The Cost of Cleaning Up Unexploded Ordnance — 2005
With continued military downsizing and base closures, cleanup of unexploded ordnance (UXO) at former weapons ranges has become one of the most costly environmental problems the military faces. This study examines cost estimation for UXO remediation conducted at closed military installations, the difficulties of accurately estimating cleanup costs, and the major effects that different cleanup requirements and methods can have on cost. It assesses previous estimates of UXO cleanup costs and evaluates the strengths and limitations of the military’s preferred cost-estimation tool, the remedial Action Cost Engineering Requirements (RACER) software package. Using a modified method of implementing RACER, the study shows how costs change depending on which cleanup protocol is followed. The results show that the choice of cleanup protocol has major cost implications.
Transferrring Army Land Containing UXO: Problems and Solutions — 2005
Since 1988, the Department of Defense has been closing bases that it no longer needs and transferring them to other government agencies, including state and local bodies, or to private organizations. Thus far, it has closed more than 100 bases and transferred about 40 percent of the land. Because it still has more bases than it needs, DoD is planning more closures in 2005. It has been particularly difficult to transfer land containing unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from military training or weapons testing, and the problem has been especially acute for the Army. Of the approximately 90,000 acres containing UXO on installations slated for closure, the Army has been able to transfer only about 10 percent. The Army would like to transfer land more rapidly, and it asked RAND Arroyo Center first to identify and assess obstacles to the transfer of land containing UXO and then to identify innovative ways to accomplish such transfer.
2004
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An Army Strategy for Homeland Security — 2004
Given the potential but undefined threat posed to the U.S. homeland by terrorists, the Army needs to decide whether it should hedge against the risk of not being adequately prepared. RAND researchers posed five plausible scenarios and potential Army responses along with an estimated cost for each. They recommend four actions the Army could take now to enhance its ability to respond to an attack on the United States.
Broadening Army Bandwidth — 2004
The Army is transforming itself from a heavy Cold War force to a much more agile one, which it has dubbed the future force. A crucial part of that transformation requires the Army to shift its communications from being segmented to being networked. The difference is that in the former it is easy to communicate up and down vertical communication stovepipes but not across them. In the latter, any node in the network can communicate with any other node. Networked communications require considerable bandwidth, which facilitates the capacity to send and receive information. The Army is concerned about whether it has enough bandwidth available and asked RAND Arroyo Center to determine the nature and extent of potential bandwidth problems for the future force. The specific concern is whether enough capacity exists to meet the operational requirements spelled out for the future force.
Microworld Simulations: A New Dimension in Training Army Logistics Management Skills — 2004
RAND Arroyo Center has been exploring ways to improve the training of Army Combat Service Support logistics personnel, focusing on a new strategy that emphasizes the processes at the core of CSS operations. The research has examined the use of micro-world models to teach complex management skills and to highlight that teaching with dynamic simulations of specific processes.
Privatizing Military Production — 2004
The Army's substantial industrial base is large compared with current or anticipated needs and thus underused. Privatizing Army ammunition plants, perhaps by turning the arsenals into a federal government corporation, could save the Army money, foster innovation and efficiency, and enable senior leaders to focus on their priority functions.
Risky Business: Assessing the Potential Harm from Unexploded Ordnance — 2004
Within the boundaries of former military bases in the United States, unexploded ordnance is causing increasing concern. Although civilian fatalities from UXO explosions on U.S. soil have been rare, the risk of such accidents could increase as more closed bases are transferred from military to civilian control.
The Effect of Age on the M1 Tank: Implications for Readiness, Workload, and Recapitalization — 2004
The Army has grown increasingly concerned about sustaining an acceptable level of operational readiness in its aging fleets. In response, it has started programs to rebuild and upgrade equipment. RAND Arroyo Center conducted a statistical analysis of the relationship between age and equipment readiness on the M1 Abrams tank. Among their findings is a 14-year old tank has twice as many critical failures as a new one.
Value Recovery from the Reverse Logistics Pipeline — 2004
Value recovery, in the form of the return and repair of reparable spare parts, involves large amounts of time as well as inventory investment for the Army. Sometimes it is cheaper to buy a new part rather than repair, but some parts are so expensive that it makes economic sense to repair them and return them to the inventory, typically as spares to replace other broken assemblies.
2003
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CWT and RWT Metrics Measure the Performance of the Army's Logistics Chain for Spare Parts — 2003
As part of its efforts to improve the logistics chain for spare parts, the Army must measure the performance of its supply system in filling orders for materiel. Velocity Management (VM) is a RAND-developed, Army-implemented system that measures such performance and seeks ways to improve it through its Define-Measure-Improve methodology. The Army effectively used customer wait time and requisition wait time to identify processes that need improvement.
Improved Equipment Sustainment Is Critical to Army Transformation — 2003
The Army's Transformation and new operational concepts put a premium on "equipment sustainability," the ability to keep weapon systems available during operations. To get better sustainability in future systems, the Army needs both better equipment and improved logistics performance. Arroyo Center research recommends that the Army adopt a standard set of metrics for defining equipment sustainment requirements to drive the Army and its providers to comprehensive solutions for improved sustainability.
Managing the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants — 2003
The Army has a large industrial base consisting of both contractor and government operated facilities. These facilities provide the Army with more capacity than it needs so a portion of this industrial base is underused or mothballed. The Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to assess options for managing these facilities. The researchers formulated a strategic vision for the Army's industrial base and considered options for the best way to realize that vision.
Strategies for an Expeditionary Army — 2003
The Army has embarked on a transformation effort to make rapid, decisive power projection capabilities a reality. Transforming CSS is essential if this transformation is to be a success.
The Army and the New National Security Strategy — 2003
The Army is transforming itself into what it calls the Objective Force. While many aspects of that transformation provide what the new national security requires, the basic concepts need significant refinement, and this collection of essays address some of the most difficult challenges.
Toward an Expeditionary Army — 2003
This report explores ways in which the Army might improve its ability to contribute to the prompt, global power-projection capability of the United States, that is, the strategic responsiveness of early-entry forces in situations where time is critical. Focusing on the Army's new Stryker Brigade Combat Team, this report begins by analyzing options, given existing technology, for improving the deployment time of Army units.
2002
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Army Distance Learning Can Enhance Personnel Readiness — 2002
In an effort to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its training, the Army has implemented the Distance Learning Program. However, some observers have questioned the feasibility of the program as it is currently designed. In the latest of a series of recent reports, RAND Arroyo Center researchers continued their analysis of the potential role for DL in tackling two issues that affect personnel readiness: personnel shortages and personnel instability.
Future Air and Missile Threats — 2002
In 2002, RAND Arroyo Center researchers analyzed six plausible future worlds to determine which type of air and missile threats might confront the Army in a range of geopolitical or strategic situations. Among the major conclusions are: the Army needs to invest more in cruise missile defense; and the Army should retain and improve its short range missile defense against aircraft.
Getting Down to Business: How Innovative Partnerships with Industry Can Benefit the Army — 2002
The Army has a growing need to collaborate and partner with industry. This document describes three nontraditional approaches to that goal, namely (1) forming real-estate public-private partnerships (PPPs), (2) using Army venture capital mechanisms as a research and development funding and collaborating tool, and (3) spinning off Army activities into federal government corporations (FGCs).The research shows that while the three concepts appear promising, each requires resolution of key issues before it can be seriously considered for implementation.
Improving Joint Operations: Lessons from Kosovo, 1999 — 2002
The problems of Operation Allied Force provide a rich source of lessons for future military operations, as discussed in a new RAND report, Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999. The analysis gives particular emphasis to the implications of NATO's decision to conduct an air-only campaign. This choice was politically acceptable, but it also made joint and multinational planning and operations more difficult, producing a somewhat "disjointed" approach. The report makes recommendations for improving planning and coordination of similar operations in the future.
Keeping the Army's Equipment Ready to Fight: A New Tool for Understanding Equipment Readiness — 2002
To keep its equipment ready to fight, the Army needsmetrics that fully portray its condition both in the motor pool and duringmissions. These metrics should connect underlying logistics processes andequipment reliability to equipment readiness results so that the Army cantarget its resources effectively. The Equipment Downtime Analyzer providesan integrated set of metrics that tie equipment sustainment and reliabilityto equipment readiness.
2001
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Can Biometrics Help the Army Solve an Identity Crisis — 2001
This research brief describes work documented in Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns (MR-1237-A). The Army is having an identity crisis, and it affects both its wartime and peacetime operations. Simply put, the Army needs to ensure that the right people – and only the right people – can get access to its information systems, its weapons, and its many databases that serve the Army community. Biometrics – that is, physical characteristics or personal traits that can be measured quickly – may offer a solution. But using biometrics raises some knotty legal, ethical, and sociological issues – for example, how to safeguard biometric information so it cannot be used for other, possibly nefarious, purposes. The Army has been studying these issues and has been considering the feasibility of establishing a biometric research center that could serve as a central data repository and carry out test and evaluation.
Deploying the Force: What the Reserve Components Can Add — 2001
The Persian Gulf War and subsequent deployments of U.S. Army forces make it clear that units from the Reserve Components (RC) will play an important part in future operations. However, their specific role hinges on how quickly they can be ready for deployment. To gain empirical evidence on the speed with which RC units could be readied, RAND's Arroyo Center analyzed the deployment of over 600 support units during the Gulf War. The researchers also analyzed a notional scenario for a future Southwest Asia conflict to determine what allocation could reasonably be made between active Army and RC support units while still meeting deployment schedules. Results appear in Thomas F. Lippiatt et al., Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units.
Enhancing Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components — 2001
The personnel readiness of the Army Reserve Components (RC) – including both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve – is an important national security issue. In fact, despite the Army's continued reliance on the RC in wartime, many of their units have long been manned significantly below wartime readiness requirements. This readiness shortfall gives rise to concerns for future contingencies: Will the Army be ready to deploy critical RC units at the required strength when they are needed? Drawing on findings presented in the RAND Arroyo Center report Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components , this research brief summarizes the efforts of Arroyo Center analysts to understand Army RC personnel readiness shortfalls, their implications, and their potential solutions.
Improved Inventory Policy Contributes to Equipment Readiness — 2001
This research brief describes work documented in Dollar Cost Banding: A New Algorithm for Computing Inventory Levels for Army Supply Support Activities (MG-128-A), Velocity Management: An Approach for Improving the Responsiveness and Efficiency of Army Logistics Processes (DB-126-1-A), and Establishing a Baseline and Reporting Performance for the Order and Ship Processes (DB-173-A).
Rebuilding the Schoolhouse: Making Army Training More Efficient and Effective — 2001
This research brief describes work documented in Enhancing Stability and Professional Development Using Distance Learning (MR-1317-A) and Army Distance Learning: Potential for Reducing Shortages in Army Enlisted Occupations (MR-1318-A).
The Army Makes a Bold Shift: Improving Reserve Training — 2001
What the Reserve Components (RC) can do and how ready they are to do it have long concerned those charged with the nation's security. Many believe that future conflicts may demand greater responsiveness, particularly from combat units. After the Persian Gulf War the Army initiated a pilot program – dubbed Bold Shift – to improve the training of high-priority RC units. Researchers from the RAND Arroyo Center analyzed the activities and performance of the pilot units, focusing on seven combat brigades. They found that the intensive training – unique in the peacetime history of the reserves – was widely accepted and generally effective for the units and reservists who participated. However, several features of the reserves limit what units can sustain, pointing to the need for a considerable period of postmobilization training.
What Effects Decisions to Enlist in the Military — 2001
This research brief describes work documented in Enlistment Decisions in the 1990s: Evidence from Individual-Level Data (MR-944).
2000 and Earlier
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Define-Measure-Improve: The Change Methodology That Has Propelled the Army's Successful Velocity Management Initiative — 2000
Velocity Management (VM) – a term coined by logistics analysts at the RAND Arroyo Center and adopted by the U.S. Army – brings a new way of doing business to U.S. Army logistics. By combining a renewed focus on the customers of the logistics system with a powerful improvement methodology, in just a few years Army logisticians have achieved dramatic and continuous performance gains in key logistics processes.
Demographics and the Changing National Security Environment — 2000
Demographic factors seldom directly cause conflict between nations. They can, however, exacerbate existing tensions and increase the risk of violent conflict. Long-term fertility trends, urbanization, migration, and changes in the ethnic composition and age profile of populations can influence the likelihood and nature of conflict among and within nations.
Research Brief
Research Brief (German Version)
Research Brief (French Version)
How Can the Army Retain High-Quality NCOs — 2000
In 1997, RAND and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy held a workshop to identify the assumptions that underpin the Army's current noncommissioned officer (NCO) leader development mechanisms and to evaluate the robustness of those assumptions as the Army moves into the 21st century.
Lightning Over Water: Assessing Options for Future Light Forces — 2000
As the world continues its post Cold War thaw, fears of major theater-level war have given way to a reality of increased numbers of smaller regional conflicts and crises. And as these conflicts and crises continue to grow in number and frequency, there is a growing need for a quickly deploying, rapid-reaction capability – in particular, U.S. Army light forces – to directly respond to, and intervene within, these situations. From the Gulf War through strife in the Balkans to subsequent challenges, one of the roles such light ground forces are being asked to play is that of defender against a much heavier enemy force until the heavier, more capable forces can arrive in theater; this raises the issue of how such light forces can be made both survivable and lethal enough in these missions.
Are Recon Operations at the NTC Getting Better? — 1999
Several years ago, RAND's Arroyo Center conducted a detailed study of battalion task force scout operations at the National Training Center (NTC). That study uncovered several significant problems, including poor planning, preparation, and communications as well as low availability of assets and low use of those that were available. More significant, most reconnaissance tasks were not done, and the scouts frequently engaged the enemy, losing about half their number in the process. The study also showed a strong correlation between good reconnaissance and success in battle, both for units undergoing training and for the opposing force.
Bridging the Gap: Consolidating Active and Reserve Training — 1999
Diminished resources have driven the Army into a relentless search for more cost-effective ways to train its forces. It also wants to tighten the links between Active and Reserve Component (AC and RC) training with an eye to improving the quality. To help accomplish both goals, the Army created the Total Army School System (TASS), whose objective is to consolidate the once-separate school systems of the active Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve. To date, however, the emphasis has fallen largely on the organization and management of the Reserve Component institutions. Earlier research by RAND Arroyo Center had shown that consolidation within the RC system could yield efficiencies, and the question arose whether consolidation across the AC and RC would yield like benefits. A team of Arroyo Center researchers carried out some exploratory research and published its findings in Consolidating Active and Reserve Component Training Infrastructure. The researchers found that any of the options they explored for conducting maintenance training offered savings ranging from 15 to 43 percent over a baseline case, at the same time increasing cross-component interaction among AC and RC trainers and students.
How Companies Perform at the National Training Center — 1999
One of the most crucial elements influencing the outcome of battles for tank and mechanized maneuver companies is how well they execute direct fires. Successful direct fire engagements result from more than the skill of the individual crews. The company commander plays a vital role as well, synchronizing the operation of a company team (a task-organized formation with diverse elements from different units). He has to visualize the battlefield and locate his unit so that it is in a position to detect and decisively engage the enemy while ensuring that his unit avoids detection. The Army leadership has voiced concern about how well companies and company commanders are performing these critical tasks and asked RAND's Arroyo Center to study the issue.
Improving Performance and Efficiency in the Total Army School System — 1999
A major objective of this educational reform process is to establish a Total Army School System (TASS) with fully accredited and integrated schools that provide standard, high-quality training and education for all components of the Army, both active (AC) and reserve (RC). Given the magnitude of the changes implied in this restructuring initiative, the Army asked RAND's Arroyo Center to assess the performance and efficiency of the existing Army school system, including a prototype regional system of RC schools. The results of this assessment are presented in The Total Army School System: Recommendations for Future Policy. Arroyo researchers conclude that while the Army is moving in the right direction with the new RC prototype, even greater improvements can be achieved in the performance and efficiency of the Army school system as a whole.
Improving Training Efficiency: Lessons from the Total Army School System — 1999
The U.S. Army has launched a series of initiatives to streamline and consolidate its extensive system of training institutions. One important objective has been to achieve cost economies while ensuring high-quality training, thus laying the foundation for a "Total Army School System" (TASS) that is more efficient and integrated across Army components (active and reserve). In Resources, Costs, and Efficiency of Training in the Total Army School System, researchers Michael G. Shanley, John D. Winkler, and Paul S. Steinberg present the final results for one major area in the assessment – resource use and efficiency of training both inside and outside a new prototype regional school system established by the Army in the southeastern region of the United States in the mid-1990s.
Making Military Education More Effective and Affordable — 1999
In response to shrinking budgets and smaller numbers of military personnel, the Department of Defense is exploring ways to reduce the costs of education and training while sustaining military preparedness. These costs are substantial; in recent years institutional training alone cost DoD $14 billion annually. In Restructuring Military Education and Training: Lessons from RAND Research, John D. Winkler and Paul S. Steinberg draw on numerous RAND studies over the last two decades to identify new directions for reorganizing military education and training in order to reduce costs while preserving effectiveness. Their analysis shows that while some forms of restructuring reduce duplication and improve resource utilization, others may have transition costs and recurring expenses large enough to outweigh any possible savings. Hence there is no "one-size-fits-all" rule guiding restructuring.
Postmobilization Training of National Guard Combat Units — 1999
In the future, major conflicts will require substantial force elements from U.S. reserve forces, potentially including the combat brigades in the Army National Guard (ARNG). These ARNG units will not be ready instantly; they will need postmobilization training before deploying to a wartime theater. However, in wartime the most likely sources of training and support – active combat units – will themselves be deploying to war as quickly as possible. This situation prompts questions about what training resources the ARNG brigades would need, where they would come from, and how long the training would take. The Army asked RAND's Arroyo Center to analyze the process and the resources – sites, training and support personnel, and opposing forces – needed to prepare the seven enhanced heavy National Guard brigades for deployment.
Quantifying the Battlefield — 1999
The National Training Center (NTC) was established with two purposes in mind: to train units and to disseminate tactical lessons learned throughout the Army. From the outset, the Army accomplished the first goal well, but as early as 1984, senior leaders were concerned that the lessons of success and failure during battles were not being captured. Although the Army had an extensive data-collection system in place, it was not organized to facilitate research, nor was it subject to systematic, quantitative analysis. Thus, many of the "lessons learned" were anecdotal, and it was unclear how broadly they applied.
Training for an AC-RC Integrated Division — 1999
In part based on a recommendation by the U.S. Commission on Roles and Missions, in 1996 the Army began planning for an integrated division composed of active and reserve component units. Such divisions could provide more flexible forces in wartime and an improved environment for reserve training in peacetime. The active component would supply the headquarters, and the combat forces would largely come from National Guard enhanced separate brigades. Since most of the soldiers would come from the same National Guard brigades that RAND's Arroyo Center had analyzed in earlier research, the Army asked RAND to evaluate the postmobilization process for the new integrated division. The goal was to tell the Army what additional time and resources – i.e., beyond what has been provided to train the enhanced brigades – are needed to prepare the integrated division for combat.
Speeding the Flow: How the Army Cut Order-and-Ship Time — 1998
For decades, through peace and war, a catalog of stubborn performance problems plagued the Army's order-and-ship process, the system Army personnel use to order and receive supplies. Each segment of the process – from placing a requisition for an item to receiving the package and every step in between – was not only slow, but also unreliable. Order-and-ship times (OST) for orders varied widely; some orders were delivered in a few days, but others took weeks, even when the ordered items were in stock. A lack of confidence in the reliability of the order-and-ship process led some Army personnel to hoard supplies and place duplicate orders. The Army long recognized these chronic problems, but repeated efforts to identify and eliminate their sources proved ineffective.
Funding Military Requirements — 1997
For many years, the Defense Department funded military retirement on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, estimating how much money was needed to write checks for current retirees and adding that amount to the budget. This system worked well as far as paying retirees went, but it did not hold policymakers fiscally responsible for today's decisions affecting the size of the future retirement bill, e.g., increasing the force size. To promote better management, in 1984, Congress directed a switch to an accrual method of funding retirement. Under this procedure, each year the services transfer into a fund the amount necessary to pay for future retirements. The amount transferred is a percentage of the service's basic pay. Thus, if a service implements policies that affect the future value of retirement benefits, it sees the budgetary consequences of that decision immediately in the form of an increase in the amount transferred to the retirement fund. Analysis by Arroyo Center researchers William Hix and William Taylor, reported in A Policymaker's Guide to Accrual Funding of Military Retirement, suggests that the current procedures do not fully capture the intent of the legislation and that changes could eventually save the Army as much as $5-6 billion annually.
Turning Light Forces into Heavy Hitters: New Technologies for U.S. Rapid Reaction Missions — 1996
In recent years, light, rapid-reaction forces have become a staple of U.S. military strategy and planning. Rather than defending predetermined territories with large, prepositioned forces, current U.S. plans call for quick and decisive deployments of lightly armed forces into locations of potential or actual hostilities.
Deterring Regional Aggressors in the Post-Cold War Era — 1995
Now that the Soviet threat has faded, U.S. deterrent strategy will focus on dissuading regional powers from attacking U.S. interests. These strategies must recognize the motivations and vulnerabilities of such aggressors. In a recent RAND report, U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening examined the prospects for military deterrence in the post-Cold War era. Working from historical case studies and analyses of aggressor behavior, they assessed how difficult it would be to deter regional aggressors, how credible a deterrent the United States could mount, and what inferences should be drawn for U.S. deterrent strategy.
Projecting Future Cocaine Use and Evaluating Control Strategies — 1995
This research brief describes work documented in Modeling the Demand for Cocaine (MR-332-ONDCP/A/DPRC) and Controlling Cocaine: Supply vs. Demand Programs (MR-331-ONDCP/A/DPRC).
Regional Deterrence: The Nuclear Dimension — 1995
The United States, in pursuing its interests over the next decade, may well come into conflict with regional adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. How best to deter nuclear threats by regional states is, thus, an important question for U.S. national security strategy. In a recent RAND report, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context, Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman outline an approach to answering this question.
Forecasting the Wages of Young Men — 1985
This research brief summarizes analysis contained in the RAND Corporation report, "Forecasting the Wages of Young Men" (R-3115-ARMY).
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